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**THE ORIGINS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ‘INTERIOR’—EVIDENCE FROM
IMPERIAL ROMAN LITERARY PRACTICES AND RELATED ISSUES**

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The pervasiveness in psychological literature of the assumption that mental events and psychology in general occur within the person—henceforth the psychological ‘interior’—is introduced and the received view of its historical origin is presented. This account is challenged and classical historical source material from the period 100 to 400 CE is interpreted in relation to factors of literary practice and related issues (mode of reading, authority and format of text, mode of writing, and author’s motivation). It is concluded that the ‘interior’ that emerges in the reflexive discourse of Imperial Rome develops in tandem with changes in literary practices and that there is consequently substantial evidence for positing an intimate relationship between these practices, subjective experience, and reflexive discourse. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

THE NATURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ‘INTERIOR’

Though it is a fundamental theme in psychological¹ literature and in Western reflexive discourse in general, the notion of the psychological ‘interior’² has largely escaped scholarly attention. This discursive entity, for that is what it is, does not, however, reflect an innate feature of the human experience, nor is it a universal aspect of human reflexive discourse, as we in the West might assume. It has a distinct historical genesis in the literature whose significance, though documented (e.g. Taylor, 1989; Cary, 2000), is scarcely acknowledged by academic psychology. It is the aim of this paper to expose this origin in the literature further still and to compare its development in a specific time period to the historical context of its authors.

To begin, first I must specify what I understand by the ‘interior’—I mean talk of an inner space or dimension, a place which contains the “inner self,” the true being of the person. In recent literature of the human sciences evidence of this ‘interior’ trope emerges obliquely yet implicitly. To give but a few examples, the ‘interior’ appears to have capacity (for decision, making, e.g.,

1. I will be using Richards’s (1992) Psychology (discipline)/psychology (subject matter) throughout the course of this article.

2. Throughout the course of this article for the purposes of simplicity I will use the term ‘interior’ to refer to all varieties of “inwardness,” “inner space,” etc. I am well aware that some may view this as problematic, but I hope that the reader will acknowledge that all other terms are equally problematic, if not more so. In addition, I will place it within single quotation marks, both to highlight it as an object of discussion and to preclude any judgment on the reality of its referent.

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Schneider & Bramstedt, 2006), depth (of reasoning, e.g. Ohtsubo & Rapoport, 2006), contents (of memory, e.g. Oberauer, (2005), and is capable of sustaining structures: of self-concept (e.g. Wentura & Greve, 2005), of intelligence (e.g. Johnson & Bouchard, 2005), of personality (e.g. Blackburn, Logan, Renwick & Donnelly (2005), and so on. The idea of a psychological ‘interior’ as a personal inner dimension underpins all of these instances of psychological discourse as the natural, innate and unquestioned locus of all psychological concepts. Moreover, to give examples of the broader “internal-external” dichotomy would be tantamount to citing cliché—it is embedded in the discourse of psychology to the extent that to remove it would leave little left. Even to label the ‘interior’ a “root metaphor” after Stephen Pepper (1935) would be misleading, because there do not seem to be any world theories based upon it, but mostly because there do not seem to be any alternatives to it. The notion is not exclusive to the discipline and is consistently present across various branches of reflexive discourse³ such as philosophy and theology, but in the present age is most obvious in Psychology.

It is further useful, given the ubiquity of this idea, to be clear about what it is not. When I am speaking about a psychological ‘interior’ I do not wish to evoke any notions of physiology, not the hippocampus, the pineal gland, nor the sinuses: there is nothing visceral to be inferred. This I mean to even include features or characteristics of the brain, epiphenomena, imprints, or other similar terminology. The notion of a psychological ‘interior’ is meant to refer to the idea that a person has within themselves a space, void, or chamber into which one may subjectively turn—not a feature that can be examined from without or in any physical manner. This differentiation has previously been made by Stephen Toulmin (1979) in terms of the distinction between “interiority” and “inwardness”: the former being “an inescapable feature of our brains” while the latter is essentially the same as my ‘interior’ as used throughout this article. As Toulmin puts it, though mental skills may be associated with internal brain physiology throughout life, they are by no means to be equated with them.⁴ Admittedly, there may well be some overlap with memory and remembrance, and also with the notion of privacy, as well as the critical issue of first- versus third-person perspectives in reflexive discourse, but these are all beyond the scope of this article. It is quite the understatement to say that there is some scope for valuable scholarship in this historical field. We are, nevertheless, exclusively concerned with the manifestation of the idea of a psychological ‘interior’—a personal inner dimension—in selected literature from the Imperial Roman period.⁵

I cannot emphasize enough how taken for granted this idea is in the modern relevant literature. The most telling substantiation of that assumption is the startling dearth of psychological literature in relation to it: It has been nigh-on impossible to prepare a review of the current state of scholarship of the ‘interior’ from within the discipline. Anything that

3. The careful reader will have noted that the term “reflexive” also implies, to an extent, an interior. This is unavoidable and it is hoped that such an observation will only serve to underline the “embeddedness” of the interior trope in modern psychological language. It is used in this article to refer to any discourse which has human experience and behavior as its central topic.

4. Moreover, Toulmin (1979), in reference to Vygotsky (see also Emerson, 1996), states that the internalization is a learned capacity. While it is expected that the ontogenetic development of ‘interior’/ “inward” language and development of reading and writing skills occur in tandem, such speculation is beyond the scope of this article, which is exclusively focused on historical phylogenesis in a specific time period.

5. I am using the phrase “Imperial Rome” as a broad description of the time period within which the historical source material originates. The empire is generally held to have begun with the reign of Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE) and ended with the deposing of Romulus Augustus in 476 CE and, given that all of the authors lived between these years, and within the empire, “Imperial Rome” is a useful shorthand. There isn’t anything particularly Roman about any of them though: all of them, bar one, wrote in Greek, including the emperor, Marcus Aurelius.

has been done, has been in vastly different fields of expertise and with much removed purposes. For example, Jesper Svenbro's (1990) work on early Greek theatre and "internalization," while interesting in that it proposes the opposite of the relationship proposed here, is regarded as "experimental" by his editors (Winkler & Zeitlin, 1990, p. 9) and has received scant interest, but crucially treats of "internalization" without much historical analysis. Additionally, Katherine Maus's (1995) work in relation to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English theater is situated in a much different historical context than the one which we are about to examine and additionally, has trouble with the notion of "inwardness" itself.

The only wholly reliable scholarship in relation to the 'interior' has been that of Charles Taylor (1989) and Philip Cary (2000), both of which are, in different proportions, historical and philosophical, and fortunately both of which generally agree on the origins of what I am calling the 'interior.' Taylor's (1989) weighty monograph on the development of modern identity points to Augustine (354–430 CE) as the innovator of our modern sense of "inwardness"—the 'interior' that is now embedded in modern reflexive language. This point Cary (2000) refines somewhat by highlighting the contribution of Plotinus (c. 232–304 CE) to Augustine's philosophical development. As such, this is the "received view" of the origins of the 'interior' dimension in reflexive discourse. It is the stated aim of this paper to examine this literature with recourse to historical context, but before that can take place, it follows that I treat of the theoretical framework within which the analysis will take place.

Late twentieth-century work in the history of psychological language and concepts has provided some clear-cut protocols from which the current thesis can begin. For one, Graham Richards's (1989) original, yet sadly somewhat overlooked *On Psychological Language* robustly and deftly tackles a problem which few psychologists probably even realize exists. The problem is that psychological states, events, and phenomena are subjective and private, and not objectively or publicly observable—so how can description, definition, or understanding of these things be agreed upon? That is, "How can it be possible to sustain the meanings of the terms which comprise the basis of PL [psychological language] in the absence of public criteria for defining their correct usage?" (Richards, 1989, p. 10). It so follows that all psychological language must be originally somehow figurative or metaphorical⁶ in origin, in that a description of a psychological state, event, or phenomena can only be made in reference to some publicly observable or acknowledgeable thing so that its meaning can be shared and understood. This he describes as "physiomorphic assimilation."

Additionally, Kurt Danziger's (1997) *Naming the Mind* provided a persuasive treatment of much of Psychology's concepts and contextual influences. He writes:

It is becoming more and more apparent that the technology of psychological research—once regarded as a neutral and passive tool—has played, and continues to play, a vitally important determining role in the history of the discipline and of the discursive objects it constructs. There is a whole family of interrelationships between concepts and practices that has not yet been fully explored or even named. (Danziger, 1997, p. 179)

Taken together, these two observations lead one to conclude that changes in psychological language are consonant with practical changes. In other words, new psychological language is stimulated by changes in social, political, technological and economic, and related practices and issues. Hence, we would expect that the development of the 'interior' trope in the extant literature would be suggestive of a contemporaneous contextual change.

6. The term "metaphoric" is admittedly somewhat misleading as regards Richards (1989) physiomorphic thesis but it will unfortunately have to suffice for the present purpose due to constraints of space.

EARLY INSTANCES OF THE 'INTERIOR'

It is only in the second century of the Christian era that any description of a distinct inner dimension emerges. Prior to this there are some allusions to an inner soul of man, but these are generally explanatory rather than insightful, in that they feature as contrived parts of broader arguments, rather than points of interest in their own right.⁷ Our analysis begins when both the Stoic philosopher Epictetus (c. 55–c. 135 CE) and the moralist and essayist Plutarch (c. 45–127 CE), though coming from radically different perspectives, place the source of all good within the human being, rather than with the gods.

“Behold,” says He [Zeus], “your fears are at haphazard, it is in vain that you desire what you desire. Do not look for your blessings outside, but look for them within yourselves; otherwise you will not find them.” (Epictetus, *Discourses*, III.24, ll. 111–112; trans. 1966)

and

But that every man has within himself the storerooms of tranquillity and discontent, and that the jars containing blessings and evils are not stored “on the threshold of Zeus” but are in the soul, is made plain by the differences in men’s passions. (Plutarch, *Moralia*, VI.473B; trans. 1957)

These excerpts differ from previous literature in that their ‘interior’ is couched in terms of a revelation, and a quasi-religious one at that too. It is as if both writers have experienced something within themselves but of that we cannot be certain. As such, we can discern in these excerpts something vaguely similar to the modern search for the authentic self, but at the same time, these ideas, occurring as they do in the midst of gods, souls and blessings, are still decidedly exotic. Additionally and crucially, these are fleeting references. It is may be surprising to a reader in the highly psychologized West of the twenty-first century, but both Epictetus in his complex Stoic ethics and Plutarch in his essays on moral character managed to speculate on the human condition, without any major reference to what we would recognize as a psychological ‘interior’; though *caveat lector*: translators oblivious to this subtlety regularly retrospectively project the notion of the ‘interior’ into these and other ancient works. In fact, in spite of the excerpt I have given above, a prime example of the lack of ‘interior’ in the literature of antiquity is, in fact, in Plutarch himself:

For the mind does not require filling like a bottle, but rather, like wood, it only requires kindling to create in it an impulse to think independently and an ardent desire for the truth. (*Moralia*, I.48C; trans. 1960).

It should be now clear that reference to an hypothetical ‘interior’ is not a necessity in reflexive discourse and does in fact have a complex historical genesis.

At any rate, reference to an ‘interior’ increased somewhat. Influenced by Epictetus in many regards, and perhaps also in this particular one, the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121–180 CE) describes a contemplative undertaking:

Men look for retreats for themselves, the country, the sea-shore, the hills; and you yourself, too, are peculiarly accustomed to feel the same want. Yet all this is very unlike a philosopher, when you may at any hour you please retreat into yourself. For nowhere does a man retreat into more quiet or privacy than into his own mind . . . (Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* IV.3; trans. 1944)

7. For example Plato, *Republic* 9:589a, Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1:52, as pointed out by Cary (2000), in contrast to the capacious language used at p. 1 above.

This, his “inner citadel” according to Pierre Hadot (1998), is deliberately constructed as a refuge from the trials of imperial governance. This is in contrast to the modern ‘interior’ which is for most assumed as both integral and effortless. Additionally, Marcus Aurelius’ ‘interior’ is exclusively for the philosopher, whereas the modern ‘interior’ is assumed to be universal. For now though, while his “inner citadel” does evoke for the first time impressions of space and latitude, it is something of a distant relative of the modern ‘interior.’

It is in the words of Plotinus, interpreter and defender of Plato, that matters progress more substantially towards modern terminology. According to Paul Henry (1991), an “internal/external distinction” emerges as a major metaphor in his *Enneads*: for the first time in extant Western discourse. Plotinus urges his students to look within themselves as part of a Platonic project to know God:

If then there is to be conscious apprehension of the powers which are present in this way, we must turn our power of apprehension inwards, and make it attend to what is there. It is as if someone was expecting to hear a voice which he wanted to hear and withdrew from other sounds and roused his power of hearing to catch what, when it comes, is the best of all sounds which can be heard (*Enneads*, V.1.12, ll. 13–21; trans. 1966)

As Philip Cary (2000) elaborates, Plotinus was attempting, by way of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s interpretation of Aristotle, to explain how the soul is related to the Platonic forms: what had been somewhat of a problem in Platonism previously. In the *Enneads* then, the turn inward is not exclusively to a space, but more so towards God as a spiritual project of self-knowledge and illumination. Therefore, the ‘interior’ that Plotinus envisages, a medium between soul and God, is quite different from our modern psychological ‘interior’, given that it reflects a profound and systematic cosmology that is absent from modern psychological discourse. Moreover, in contrast to those writers that we have already met, his ‘interior’ invokes notions of divine power, rather than the “retreat” of Marcus Aurelius and the “blessings” and “goods” of Epictetus and Plutarch. In other words, it has a certain degree of substantiality and constancy that they do not have, though is not without effort or exceptionality.

For the current thesis, the significance of Plotinus’s work and development of the ‘interior’ is in the influence that is ascribed to him by Augustine, bishop of Hippo and “Doctor of the Church.” In his *Confessions*, Augustine explains his intellectual and spiritual development in the guise of a monologue with God, but also for educating the literate Christian audience. He speaks of how God directed him towards Christianity through Platonism:

By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With you as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel, and was given power to do so because you had become my helper (Ps. 29:11). I entered and with my soul’s eye, such as it was saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind . . . (Augustine, *Confessions*, VII, 10.16; trans. 1991)

These “books of the Platonists” are generally agreed to include the *Enneads* of Plotinus, and are decisive in Augustine’s subsequent conversion to Christianity and also for his development of the ‘interior.’ Essentially, Augustine constructs what Cary (2000) describes as self as an inner space, an inner space to find God. His “inward turn” differs from that of Plotinus in that his necessitated an upward dimension to find God, after an initial inward turn to a personal inner space, which was for the neo-Platonist both public and wholly divine (i.e., “in then up,” as opposed to simply “in”). In that regard, Augustine’s ‘interior’ is almost a natural part of creation, containing the memory, the mind, and the will as features of an inner landscape. This is a tremendous development in the history of reflexive discourse, dwarfing the allusions to the ‘interior’ already mentioned, *viz.*—

People are moved to wonder by mountain peaks, by vast waves of the sea, by broad waterfalls on rivers, by the all-embracing extent of the ocean, by revolutions of the stars. But in themselves they are uninterested. They experience no surprise that when I was speaking of all these things, I was not seeing them with my eyes. On the other hand, I would not have spoken of them unless the mountains and waves and rivers and stars (which I have seen) and the ocean (which I believe on the reports of others) I could see inwardly with dimensions just as great as if I were actually looking at them outside my mind. Yet when I was seeing them, I was not absorbing them in the act of seeing with my eye. Nor are the actual objects present to me, but only their images. And I know by which bodily sense a thing can become imprinted on my mind.

But these are not the only things carried by the vast capacity of my memory. Here also are the skills acquired through the liberal arts which have not been forgotten. They are pushed into the background in some interior place—which is not a place. (Augustine, *Confessions*, X, 8.15–9.16; trans. 1991)

Note, in contrast to Plotinus, who turns inward to a power, Augustine turns inward to a place. His admission that this is not a real place notwithstanding, it is crucial to acknowledge the difference between the two. Reverence and wonder aside, the ‘interior’ he describes is much closer modern notion than any previous: more natural, as opposed to Plotinus’ supernatural, and more discovered, as opposed to Marcus Aurelius’s devised. The significance of these observations will become clear when we contrast these writers’ literary aims and practices.

What happens after Augustine is beyond the scope of this article: what we are concerned with is the relationship between the psychological ‘interior’ and literary practices in Imperial Rome. It should be pointed out though, nevertheless, that in the “received view” of how the ‘interior’ developed only Augustine and, to a lesser extent, Plotinus, are of importance and in that regard my reporting of Epictetus, Plutarch, and Marcus Aurelius is purely in anticipation of the analysis to follow.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SILENT READING

This account, however, is remarkably lacking interpretive depth. It does not explain why, for example, Augustinian inwardness has survived for so long in Western discourse. Other notions introduced by him have fallen from favor considerably—the will (Dihle, 1982), for example, from occupying whole chapters in textbooks a century ago and now seldom scrutinized. Yet the ‘interior,’ albeit secularized, has remained. Above all, this account goes no way to explaining why this “inward turn” only occurred to any great degree to Plotinus and Augustine, nor why the latter develops it more, nor why this metaphor had not occurred to any of the philosophers before them. Given that Cary (2000) points out that it “fixes” a problem in Platonic metaphysics, it surely would have been equally useful to the many generations of Platonic philosophers that came and went between Plato (*fl.* 4th c. BCE) and Plotinus (*fl.* 3rd c. CE). It follows that there must be something other than philosophical reasoning involved.

What we are looking for is a contextual factor that can help to explain this development in accordance with the work of Richards (1989) and Danziger (1997) as described above. I propose, therefore, that the only factors that could possibly have served to engender the notion of an ‘interior’ were literary practices and related issues. Across the period that we will be examining (c. 100 to c. 400 CE) there are significant changes in the major literary activity engaged in by the selected authors.

At this point I am going to be especially precise. There are a number of factors involved, each of which I will attempt to deal with separately, where possible, and each of which is

intimately involved with the development of the 'interior' dimension in the reflexive discourse of this period.

The first factor is the reader's⁸ mode of reading (social and oral versus private and silent) and this is the one which I propose is of primary, though not absolute, importance. Related to this is the authority of the text that he or she is reading (self-penned versus teacher versus canonical scripture), which is of less importance, as well as the issue of the format of the text (scroll versus codex). Of additional importance is the author's mode of composition (dictation/amanuensis versus hand-written). Finally, the motivation or purpose for writing of the text (private journal versus scholarly textbook versus unrestricted publication) is also of certain importance. Taking all of these factors together, a reasonably thorough picture of an author's literary practices should be achieved; however, a number of provisos must be taken on board.

First, in dealing with authors from classical antiquity this may not be completely possible due to paucity of reliable information. Second, such a complete picture may not be necessary to construct, as not every factor is involved in each case. Third, given the breadth and depth of an individual's life, what we are most concerned with is the dominant, most important, and most influential of these factors at the time of composition. Consequently, I may not interpret in relation to each of the factors mentioned in each case.

As I have intimated, the foremost contextual factor consonant with the development of the notion of the 'interior' in the reflexive discourse as outlined above is the mode of reading. Specifically, vis-à-vis Richards (1989) and Danziger (1997), the corresponding contextual development is the shift from social and oral reading to silent and private reading. At this point, an aside is necessary for the purposes of clarification.

It is no exaggeration to say that as a topic of academic debate the prevalence of silent reading in classical antiquity has a history in itself; perhaps a history that will itself some day become subject to scholarly scrutiny. The debate itself is over a century old, having been begun with Eduard Norden in 1898 (oral reading was the norm in antiquity), firmly established by Josef Balogh in 1927 (silent reading was highly rare in antiquity), and rebutted by Bernard Knox in 1968 (silent reading was common in antiquity), and then continuing with the rejoinders of Alexander Gavrillov and Myles Burnyeat in 1997 (modern and ancient reading differs little), as well as Paul Sanger's opposing monograph of the same year (silent reading only became common in the middle ages), to name but a few. Basically, this debate has veered rather disappointingly from one extreme—the ancients could not read silently—to the other: the ancients always read silently. As William Johnson's (2000) recent paper states ". . . the polemics are such that we are now presumed fools if we suppose that the ancients were not *able* to read silently" (2000, p. 593; italics in original). Dissatisfied with this "crystallization" of the debate—particularly, I believe, with Gavrillov's (1997) penultimate sentence, ". . . the phenomenon of reading itself is fundamentally the same in modern and in ancient culture . . ." (p. 69)—Johnson (2000) begins moves toward a sociological approach to the topic, so as to appreciate the differences between ancient reading and ours. This is based on an appreciation of, that while silent reading does appear to have occurred right throughout antiquity, there does seem to have been a widespread practice of oral reading that is absent from modern society. As such, Johnson (2000) chooses to examine reading in a specific era as part of a socio-cultural system—i.e., with regard to the type of text being read, the context in which it is being read,

8. The intricacy of analysis has necessitated the separation of the social roles of reader and author in the case of each individual historical figure, which are obviously the same person.

the event in which it is taking place, and the relationship between the reader's identity and his or her reading culture—rather than the narrow isolated act which the historical debate on silent reading had focussed previously.

This approach, taking into account as it does the context of the reader and the significance of that practice in their culture, is far more conducive to the aims of the current paper. For one, the main part of Johnson's (2000) own paper is concerned with constructing a model of ancient reading within the specific context of the reading of Greek literary prose texts by the educated elite during the first and second centuries CE (p. 606 ff.). By examining in detail this precise context, from the nature and dimensions of the text being read, to the character of the literature, to the social status of the readers, Johnson (2000) can easily conclude that while the ability to read silently may well have been extant, or even prevalent, the reading of these specific texts was frequently oral and social. In particular, Johnson (2000) characterizes the bookrolls or scrolls of this time as *performance scripts*—in that the reader (*lector*), often a literate slave, was expected to interpret and perform the largely unpunctuated text for the entertainment of their audience, similar to other after-dinner acts, like storytellers, musicians, and poets.⁹ This is best exemplified by the picture that he paints of this reading model—of a high-quality and professionally produced scroll being read by an educated slave, holding it up in both hands, and declaiming it to a banqueting audience of the privileged.

Moreover, in constructing a model of ancient reading within the specific context of the reading of Greek literary prose texts by the educated elite during the first and second centuries CE, Johnson (2000) has thus constructed the model of reading that Epictetus and Plutarch would be most familiar with. It is also likely to have been prevalent in the times of both Marcus Aurelius and Plotinus, though perhaps not Augustine, for reasons that will become clear presently.

In a similar vein, James Ker (2004) has made an in-depth analysis of the extraordinary culture of *lucubratio*: the practice of night-writing. Ker (2004) cites many examples and in doing so reveals the character of this practice as highly socially pertinent. When a writer in the Imperial Roman period described himself as writing at night (literally burning the midnight oil), by practicing his rhetorical skills, by working when everyone else was sleeping, he was *elevating himself socially* due to his dedication to the *res publica*. As such, though writing alone at night, and far from his intended audience, the practice of *lucubratio* was still, in effect, a performance.

It is this aspect of Imperial Roman written culture that we must bear in mind when we come to the historical analysis of literary practices: their intimate relationship with social performance for the good of the *res publica*. This emphasis is reflected in the literary technology of those times to a more profound degree than might be imagined. Saenger's (1997) monograph, which describes the relationship between the prevalence of silent reading and word spacing, notes that “. . . the Roman Empire, which for a time enjoyed the widespread use of interpunct-separated Latin script with vowels, chose to discard that form of writing for *scriptura continua* [script without word separation]” (p. 10). Saenger (1997) ascribes this return to traditional methods to social forces: while spaced words made reading easier and faster, thereby lending itself to silent reading, the traditional Roman emphasis on oratory and rhetoric meant that oralization had to remain paramount, hence the return to *scriptura continua*. As such, the high interrelationship between text, culture, and practice must be noted.

This, then, is the intellectual milieu in which the current historical analysis is situated. It is out of this reading culture—with its strong emphasis on performance—that the corpus of

9. For a fascinating insight into the ubiquity of *lectors* in the life of the Roman Imperial elite, see Starr (1991).

literature that we are examining arose. Hence, it isn't that Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and the like were unable to read silently, but rather that that ability was not valued socially—in contrast to oratory, which was. For various reasons beyond the scope of this article,¹⁰ this preeminence of oratory began to change, albeit slowly. As such, in terms of the literary practices that we are concerned with in this study, it is not the major factor of the mode of reading, that we are first interested in (nor the authority, readership, or format of the text), but more so the mode of writing involved. Essentially, while reading was still a largely social and public performance, writing was becoming a private activity, and people began writing for themselves.

HYPOMNĒMATA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF READING AS A PRIVATE PRACTICE

A topic that had increasing importance late in the career of Michel Foucault is that of *hypomnēmata*. In the era that we are examining at this starting point (the first two centuries CE, roughly speaking) and for some time prior to it, these were personal notebooks used by the literate class to manage their lives, as well as aiding memory by recording important aphorisms. They are of particular significance for the current thesis and are best explained in Foucault's own words:

Such is the objective of the *hypomnēmata*: to make of the recollection of the fragmentary *logos* transmitted by teaching, listening, or reading a means to establish as adequate and as perfect a relationship of oneself to oneself to oneself as possible. (1984a, p. 365).

Here characterized in typical Foucauldian fashion as items of some profundity, it is worth bearing in mind at the same time that Myles McDonnell (1996) equates *hypomnēmata* to “students’ notes”: there is accordingly a considerable latitude of interpretation available here. The main point to be derived from McDonnell (1997) is that while Rome was replete with professional copyists,¹¹ it was still nonetheless acceptable for members of the elite to write documents in their own hand, something he maintains carried a similar amount of prestige as the ability to read. The writing of *hypomnēmata* came to acquire a certain solemnity as something that a virtuous person should engage in. In the works which we have already examined, this practice is clearly evident:

Have thoughts like these ready at hand by night and by day; write them, read them, make your conversation about them, communing with yourself, or saying to another, “Can you give me some help in this matter?” (Epictetus, *Discourses*, III.24, l. 103; trans. 1966)

and

. . . for talkativeness will be less unpleasant when its excesses are in some learned subject. Yet such persons must accustom themselves to do some writing in a narrative form in private. . . . But with the talker, such shadow-boxing with the pen and such alarums, by keeping him away from the multitude, may perhaps make him less of a daily burden to his associates, just as dogs that vent their anger on sticks and stones are less savage to men. (Plutarch, *Moralia*, VI.514C-D; trans. 1957)

According to Foucault, the “technologies of the self” of this time, which include *hypomnēmata*, are not strictly private activities—“. . . one of the most important aspects of

10. One factor is likely political: as Rome moved from the Republic to the Principate Imperial and to the Dominate Imperial phases of its history, the Senate and hence political oratory became increasingly important.

11. The importance of the role of the secretary in Imperial Rome has been previously identified by Horsfall (1995).

this activity devoted to oneself: it constituted, not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice” (1984b, p. 51). As such, *hypomnēmata* of this kind yet resemble the “performance scripts” mentioned by Johnson (2000) above; even though the writer may be reading them back to himself, they are still part of social practice.

There are significant parallels between the mode of writing that Epictetus and Plutarch engaged in and the degree to which the ‘interior’ trope occurs. In the case of the former, his *Discourses* were in fact transcribed by his pupil Arrian and it is not known how many actual *hypomnēmata* he executed himself, though the *Suda* of the tenth century mentions that he “wrote many books” (“Epiktetos,” trans. 2005). Correspondingly, his use of the ‘interior’ trope is, as we have seen, rather limited, though the reference to inner “blessings” does appear powerfully.

In Plutarch’s case, there is evidence that as well as urging the talkative to engage in such practices, that Plutarch himself wrote *hypomnēmata* (Van der Stockt, 1999), which is consistent by this analysis to his reference to inner blessings. However, there is also evidence that at least some of his literary activity was conducted using, not much note-taking, but rather his own memory and a team of research assistants and scribes, either freedmen or slaves, to whom he gave orders and dictated, while “writing” several pieces in tandem (Pelling, 1979). In that scenario, it becomes much clearer why he would describe the mind as being more like wood that requires kindling, than a vessel that requires filling (see p. 5 above), given his experience of being the creative inspiration for a host of contingent and dependent issues.

At this point it is not possible to decipher much more (in relation to the other literary practices and issues)—on the one hand there is not enough biographical material available, and on the other, not enough reference to an ‘interior.’ In both Epictetus and Plutarch we have a largely traditional model of literary practices but there is clearly some evidence in both cases of correspondence between reflexive discourse and literary practices, as the mode of writing—*hypomnēmata*—has emerged and there is reference to an ‘interior.’ These relationships are entirely consistent with the observations of both Richards (1989) and Danziger (1997). What is more, a greater depth of analysis that can be derived in reference to Foucault. He states that

... it is not enough to say that the subject is constituted in a symbolic system. It is not just in the play of symbols that the subject is constituted. It is constituted in real practices—historically analyzable practices. There is a technology of the constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems while using them. (1984a, p. 369)

Therefore, we should not expect that *hypomnēmata* and other related literary practices will simply act as sources of psychological language, but that they may actually come to *constitute* the psychological experience itself. This becomes clearer as our analysis progresses historically, and as the other factors become salient.

Given that in *hypomnēmata* the reader, writer and audience were now effectively becoming one, something inevitably changed. As Foucault says,

The new concern with self involved a new experience of self. The new form of the experience of the self is to be seen in the first and second century when introspection becomes more and more detailed. A relation developed between writing and vigilance. Attention was paid to nuances of life, mood and reading, and the experience of oneself was intensified and widened by virtue of this act of writing. A whole field of experience opened up which earlier was absent. (1988, p. 28)

It is precisely this relationship that has engendered the ‘interior’ trope in the works that have been mentioned so far, and precisely the relationship that is further augmented by students adhering to the exhortations of the likes of Epictetus and Plutarch.

Though he converted to Stoicism around the age of 25 after reading Epictetus's *Discourses*, Marcus Aurelius wrote his *Meditations* much later in life. They have been shown by Pierre Hadot (1995) to be best understood as the Emperor's spiritual exercises in self-improvement. This is clear from the structure and content of the work: its "books" overlap and several passages are repeated, suggesting repetitive affirmation. In his own words, Hadot (1998) writes,

As he wrote the *Meditations*, Marcus was thus practicing Stoic spiritual exercises. He was using writing as a technique or procedure in order to influence himself, and to transform his inner discourse by meditating on the Stoic dogmas and rules of life. (p. 51)

Written daily by his own hand, these entirely spiritual *hypomnēmata* were never intended for publication, and Hadot (1998) speculates that they were written either on loose sheets or tablets, and perhaps not even assimilated into book scroll form until after his death.

The *Meditations* are, therefore, a critical development in the history of "technology of the self" in that they are fundamentally private: this is a definite shift from Foucault's (1984b) "social practice." However, at the same time, given Marcus Aurelius's purpose in writing—of urging himself to better execution of his duties—it cannot be denied that what he wrote to himself nonetheless constituted a "performance script" of the kind that Johnson (2000) mentions. In that respect, and also taking into account the repeated passages, we cannot be certain of whether or not Marcus Aurelius read silently. It is clear that his focus was on disciplining himself mentally, and writing with that objective, rather than creating a complete text—as Brian Stock (1994) remarks, "the creation of texts takes his attention away from his internal life" (p. 840). These factors are instrumental in the idiosyncratic characterisation of the 'interior' in his *Meditations*: more contrived than discovered, more invoked than evoked—a retreat, not a residence. This observation accords well not only with what we know of the Emperor's daily routine but also with Foucault's (1984) characterization of the constitution of the self in—and with—reading and writing practices as technology of the self.

As we have previously seen, the *Enneads* of Plotinus are involved in the conventional history of the notion of the 'interior' in their apparent influence on Augustine. But in accordance with the analysis revealed above, by now it should be unsurprising that his literary practices are similarly revealing. His student Porphyry (who arranged and edited his *Enneads*) wrote "The life of Plotinus" and in it he describes his master's method of composition:

He worked out his train of thought from beginning to end in his own mind, and then, when he wrote it down, since he had set it all in order in his mind, we wrote continuously *as if he was copying from a book*. Even if he was talking to someone, engaged in continuous conversation, he kept to his train of thought. . . . In this way he was present at once to himself and to others, and he never relaxed his self-tuned attention except in sleep: even sleep he reduced by taking very little food . . . (8, ll. 8–12, 19–22; trans. 1966; italics added)

Immediately and obviously, Porphyry's use of the copying metaphor directly suggests a relationship between his master's subjective experience and behavior. Disregarding the "inwardness" inherent in the language of this modern translation, it is clear that Plotinus's personal and private mode of writing was constitutive of his subjective experience, as per Foucault (1988, p. 28 above). Furthermore, it seems certain that Plotinus read silently:¹²

One can find a great many valuable activities, theoretical and practical, which we carry on both in our contemplative and active life even when we are fully conscious, which do not

12. This is made even more likely by the fact that Porphyry says that Plotinus's eyesight was poor and could only read briefly.

make use aware of them. The reader is not necessarily aware that he is reading, least of all when he is really concentrating . . . (*Enneads*, I.4.10, ll. 24–28; trans. 1966)

Thus in Plotinus we have the continual practice of personal writing and silent reading of a personally created text. In the light of the material already covered, it should be clear how this practice is consistent with his exhortation (p. 7 above) to look within to find the soul's power. For Plotinus, working out everything mentally before writing it out, re-reading silently, and maintaining concentration throughout his daily life, it is unlikely that he could have ever conceived of the soul's divine powers as being anywhere else other than within himself. As Cary (2000) says,

Plotinus himself says we must turn inward to find God because the higher part of the soul, continually contemplating, is identical to the divine Mind. Hence turning into the soul's interior is turning to God, and self-knowledge yields knowledge of all that is divine, eternal, and ultimate. (p. 28–29)

As such, the relationship that Plotinus cultivated in the manipulation of text, in the way that he practiced reading and writing, corresponds to how he characterized the relationship between the human soul and God. The inspiration for his idiosyncratic metaphysics can be deduced from his specific literary practices. For one, in maintaining his train of thought even during talking to other people, Plotinus's practice is analogous to his assertion that the higher part of the soul is eternally contemplating. Moreover, while deliberately composing his thoughts before writing them down, Plotinus's behavior is congruent with turning inward to a source of divine and eternal knowledge. Again, there is a correspondence between literary practice, subjective experience, and psychological language—not simply in terms of literary practices as source material for psychological language, but literary practices influencing subjective experience and thereby producing changes in psychological language.

AUGUSTINE AND THE INFLUENCE OF CANONICAL SCRIPTURE

In the same way that we have examined the literary practices of Epictetus, Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius, and Plotinus, it so follows that the same is done for Augustine. First, as to his mode of reading. Given the culture of social and oral reading that was prevalent in his age and prior to him, and that he was a teacher of rhetoric, it is not surprising that we find evidence of it in his writings—while speaking of the solace of friendship in his *Confessions*, he mentions this activity (IV, 7.13). However, Augustine also refers to silent, and private, reading at a number of occasions. In a letter to Nebridius, dated 387, Augustine gives us a fascinating insight into his private life, saying “I read your letter beside my lamp after supper: immediately after which I lay down, but not at once to sleep; for on my bed I meditated long, and talked thus with myself—Augustin addressing and answering Augustin . . .” (Letter III, 1; trans. 1886). But even more tellingly, in his later-written *Confessions*, the famous episode of his conversion experience in the garden in Milan is culminated as follows:

. . . suddenly I heard a voice from the nearby house chanting as if it might be a boy or girl (I do not know which), saying and repeating over and over again “Pick up and read, pick up and read.” . . . So I hurried back to the place where Alypius was sitting. There I had put down the book of the apostle when I got up. I seized it, opened it and in silence read the first passage on which my eyes lit . . . (VII, 12.29; trans. 1991).

As Stock (1996) states in his extensive study of the significance of reading in the *Confessions*, silent reading “is best understood as a complex symbol that is adapted to different ends” (p. 63) at certain instances in the work. These issues we will come to presently, but not

before treating of the rest of Augustine's literary activity, for now it must suffice to say that he did, in fact, read silently and privately.

In terms of the authority of the texts that would have influenced Augustine most in his reading, and in relation to the 'interior,' the initial choice is clearly the "books of the Platonists" which he himself implicates in his "return into himself." By this factor then, Augustine's experience would be comparable to all of the cases we have already met: reading philosophical texts. However, on closer analysis, this isn't the complete case. As Cary (2000) points out, having encountered Platonism in Milan, Augustine moved to Cassicacum, but didn't bring those books with him, so "the changes of mind that took place that year seem to have been stimulated by a rather slight amount of Neoplatonist reading" (p. 34). What is crucial to note however, is that in contrast to all of the authors that we have met previously, Augustine was not reading just philosophy—he was also reading biblical scripture. As much as the "books of the Platonists" may have persuaded him to "look within himself," it was a book of the Bible that he took up when he heard the divine injunction to "pick up and read." In Cary's (2000) words, "It is, however, quite clear that for Augustine the latter [scripture] has more authority than the former [Platonic texts]" (p. 41) and as such we can be certain that the texts that influenced him most would have been scripture, contrary to all those that we have already met.

As significant as the difference between scripture—as divinely inspired—and philosophical texts—as human endeavours—is, it is not the complete Augustinian account. Augustine himself promoted Athanasius's list of books of the New Testament (Lindberg, 2005) which was accepted at the first Synod of Hippo in 393, which he attended, and was also a signatory to the same list sent for approval to Rome by the Synod of Carthage in 397. Augustine's influence also led to the adoption of a Latin translation the Greek Septuagint as the canon of the Old Testament, against the wishes of Jerome, who would have preferred a Latin translation of the Hebrew original texts (Fitzgerald & Cavadini, 1999; also various letters to Jerome, XXVII, LXXI, etc.). He was, therefore, heavily involved in the standardization of the Bible to, ultimately, its modern Roman Catholic arrangement (Schaff, 1886, p. 19). Thus for Augustine, scripture is not simply divine, it is canonical scripture, divine and standard, and it is both of these aspects of his reading material that make it largely incommensurable with that of the previous figures, from his perspective at least.

Furthermore, and again in contrast to all of those that we have met already, the book that Augustine "opened and in silence read the first passage on which his eyes lit" would have certainly been a codex, not a book scroll. This has been well illustrated by Colin H. Roberts and T. C. Skeat (1983), showing that the codex was adopted by the Christian community no later than 100 CE. They point out that if the first Gospel was written in a codex, that would have certainly made the format more appealing to the early Christians—visibly contrasting the new religion from the scrolls of both pagan philosophy and Judaism. Robert Kraft (2002) has also characterized the development of the canonical scripture as related to the change from scroll to codex—i.e., that the concept of canon became "concretized" once it was possible to visualize the Bible in one volume. At any rate, Roberts and Skeat (1983) conclude that by 300 CE the codex format had achieved parity with the scroll, which declined rapidly thereafter.¹³ In that respect, Augustine's practice of reading is both materially and thematically of a different nature to those we have met previously: not only scripture, but scripture in codex form.¹⁴

13. Roberts and Skeat (1983) also point out that somewhere between 84 and 86 CE some work of Martial was published in codex form—an experiment they describe as "still-born." It is likely that this innovation failed, like the introduction of word-spacing mentioned by Saenger (1997), due to social forces preferring the oral reading model associated with the scroll.

14. Stock (1996, p. 97) hints as well that Augustine's previous reading material may have been largely in scroll format—a conjecture I believe quite likely.

In the terms of our analysis of the rest of his literary practices, the next factor is his mode of writing. The clearest exposition of this activity is revealed at the very beginning of his *Soliloquies*, written just after his conversion to Christianity and baptism. Significantly, it is in the form of a dialogue between Augustine and “Reason.” It is, according to Hadot (1995), of a similar genre to the *Meditations*. Augustine says he has been “debating within myself” about his “real self” when he hears a voice urging him to compose his thoughts:

Such things must, then, be written down. But how will you do this, when your health does not admit of the labor of writing them? They cannot be dictated, for they demand absolute solitude. (*Soliloquies*, I, 1, trans. 1910)

It is clear from this excerpt that Augustine’s mode of writing is similar to that of Marcus Aurelius and Plotinus—privately and personally.

We now come to the last factor of the analysis: the intended readership of his work. At an early stage in his *Confessions* (II, 3.5) Augustine states that he writes not for God, but for the human race—a noteworthy change from the élitism of the texts of the philosophical schools that we have already met. Stock (1996, p. 65) has further remarked that Augustine broke specifically with the elitism of Plotinus. Christianity, of course, generally implied salvation for all, and as a man of the cloth, this was central to Augustine’s vocation.

Thus, in the period when Augustine developed his ‘interior,’ not only had his mode of reading changed, but also the authority of the texts he was reading changed significantly, becoming more meaningful and definitive. We have also seen that his mode of writing at this time was most meaningfully private and that his intended readership was universal (Catholic), in contrast to the other authors. These are the issues that I believe were instrumental in altering his subjective experience and consequently the engendering of the ‘interior’ dimension in his writings.

In terms of the major factors put forward at the beginning of the historical analysis—modes of reading and writing—Augustine does not stand out as unique. It is only the lesser factors—authority of the text being read, format of the text being read, and intended readership of the text written—that distinguish him. This should at least serve to illustrate that the emergence of the ‘interior’ dimension in any given reflexive discourse is not an inevitability. But more to the point, given that the format of the text essentially enhances private reading, it is the authority of the text being read, and the motivation for the text written that are therefore most important.

In the first case then, what we are dealing with is the significance of scriptural canon texts versus *hypomnēmata* and all other varieties of authorship in the development of the ‘interior’ dimension. It is my assertion, in light of Foucault’s (1988) practices constituting selves, Richards’s (1989) physiomorphic assimilation, and Danziger’s (1997) technology determining discursive objects, that the difference between the ‘interiors’ that we have encountered is chiefly due to the differences in their respective reading material. In the case of Augustine, it seems clear that his reading of scripture, with its significance as divine, and authority as canonical, corresponds parsimoniously with the character of his ‘interior’ as autochthonous, capacious, and reified. This is in marked contrast to the previous examples: of texts edited, amended and revised and ‘interiors’ consciously, deliberately and effortfully practiced.

In the second case, of the intended readership of Augustine’s work, we are dealing with the contrast between his writing for all humanity, whereas the philosophers were generally writing either for themselves or for their students. With that in mind, a unique ingenuity emerges from his work that is not present in any literature prior to him, and seldom since.

INDUCTION

As I have said, the crucial period is when Augustine develops his 'interior' initially, and how it is developed. Ostensibly, this is after reading the "books of the Platonists" and these are, as Cary (2000) has shown, what give Augustine the theoretical framework for his 'interior.' The new dimension in his psychological language then emerges in his ensuing works—for example his *De Musica* (began in 387), as well as his *Soliloquies* (386). But the 'interior' is most eloquently expounded in his *Confessions*, from which our original example (see p. 13) was taken, and which was written some time later (397). This is the work which was written for all humanity, and Stock (2001) mentions that Augustine "left his own readers the transcript of this experience in the narrative books of the *Confessions*, doubtless in order to encourage them to try his method of conversion for themselves" (p. 3). The fact that Augustine's motivation for writing differs from all the others mentioned previously gives his writing a much different character, and moreover, is behind certain features seldom found elsewhere in literature—what Stock (2001) terms "literary inventions."

Before clarifying the nature of these devices and their relationship to the current thesis, it must be borne in mind that by this time Augustine had quite a sophisticated understanding of the nature of literature. For example, in a letter written in 390, he stated,

. . . if, on reading these things, you approve of them, and perceive them to be true, you must not consider them to be mine otherwise than as given to me; and you are at liberty to turn to that same source whence proceeds also the power given you to appreciate their truth. For no one discerns the truth of that which he reads from anything which is in the mere manuscript, or in the writer, but rather by something within himself . . . (Letter XIX, trans. 1910)

In appreciation of thinking like this that recurs throughout Augustine's work, Stock (1996) concludes that "Augustine believes that reading is essential for 'spiritual' development in the individual, but he is pessimistic about the degree of 'enlightenment' that reading itself confers" (p. 278). It seems that Augustine had some kind of appreciation of the relationship between subjective experience and literary practices, and consequently, given his vocation, it shouldn't be too surprising to suggest that he used this knowledge to his own ends. As Brown (2000) suggests, the *Confessions* is "written in the form of a prayer," a form which "would have increased their value as a philosophical exercise" (p. 159). In the preceding era, philosophical exercises were part of a students training—meditations, visualizations and routines (see Hadot, 1995)—but in the creation of his *Confessions*, Augustine "transformed an ancient contemplative practice into a new type of mental exercise that had both literary and spiritual dimensions" (Stock, 2001, p. 13). Effectively, there are a number of literary inventions or devices used within the *Confessions* in an attempt to engender a certain experience within the reader.

These devices include the superfluous amount of Platonism in Book 7, used to introduce and explain the notion of the 'interior,' but also two powerful images of silent reading. The first was in 386 in Milan and prior to his conversion experience in the garden. At this stage, Augustine has come to Milan and become a catechumen, though perhaps only superficially, according to Brown (2000). He visits Ambrose, the highly influential bishop of the city, and finds him alone and reading:

Very often when we were there, we saw him silently reading and never otherwise. After sitting for a long time in silence (for who would dare to burden him in such intent concentration?) we used to go away. We supposed if he read silently to protect himself in case he had a hearer interested and intent on the matter, to whom he might have to

expound the text being read if it contained difficulties, to whom he might have to debate some difficult questions. . . . Whatever motive he had for his habit, this man had a good reason for what he did. (VI, 3.3; trans. 1991)

Surely, writing several years later Augustine understood Ambrose's ulterior motive—to lead by example. In reading silently in Augustine's presence Ambrose was instructing the young catechumen in how he should gain insight into scripture: by reading alone and silently. But by not explaining Ambrose's real motive in his *Confessions*, Augustine emulates him. There is literary subterfuge at play here—Augustine is drawing us into his own experience. By casting Ambrose's behavior in a mysterious light, Augustine is encouraging the reader to interpret it, and thereby conjecture toward an 'interior.'

The other major device occurs at Augustine's own conversion in Book 8. On opening the codex of the gospels at Romans 13.13, which urges the reader to a life of piety, Augustine is converted to Christianity. Additionally, Alypius continues reading beyond where Augustine stops, and interprets the successive verse as being of converting significance for himself. Both of these accounts of the conversion experience must be viewed in contrast to that of Anthony which Augustine has interwoven into the account. While Anthony chances to overhear a scriptural verse that he interprets for himself, and is converted, Augustine overhears a message that he interprets as a command to read scripture, which he randomly searches and finds something that he then ascribes for himself and is converted; Alypius is converted on simply reading scripture. In other words, from Anthony's quite dramatic and inadvertent conversion experience, to Augustine's somewhat dramatic but somewhat manufactured conversion experience, to Alypius's casual reading conversion experience, one is left with the impression that conversion need not necessarily be spectacular—it can simply occur from reading scripture. Again, Augustine is rhetorically drawing us into his experience, converting us to his way of thinking, and drawing us closer to the scriptures.

This is not to debase his conversion experience (although it must be said that the vast majority of his commentators accept his account uncritically and ontologically) but instead to appreciate his reporting of it through the lens of current scholarship in the history of reflexive discourse: a complex interaction of literary practices, subjective experience, and the language of reflexive discourse, not to mention the author's own motivation.

Given Augustine's vocation, it is impossible to analyze his works without acknowledging his motivation, and his intended readership. On review, it seems very likely that when writing his narrative he nuanced certain aspects of his experience in order to evoke a similar certain experience in his reader. It is also worth noting that by the time he was writing the *Confessions*, Augustine had gotten his way with regard to the canon of scriptural books and was assured of his place within the Church. Hence, the bishop of Hippo develops the 'interior' not simply as a feature of his theology, but as a method of conversion. There is a meta-level of significance in his *Confessions* that was doubtless instrumental in its popularity and hence the propagation and adoption of the idea of the 'interior.'

At same time, on reflection of Augustine's significance, it is now appropriate to review the historical material overall. The most obvious conclusion would be to say that the psychological 'interior' was created in subjective experience by a shift in literary practices. This, however, would be simplifying things considerably. For one thing, only Augustine has explicitly reported what his subjective experience was: the rest are more oblique in referring to the 'interior,' generally speaking in the second or third person. What is clear is that there is a shift in the language of reflexive discourse as changes in literary practices and related issues occur. The new dimension in reflexive discourse does not have to have been consciously chosen—as Richards (1989) asserts, there need not be any appreciation of the figurative nature of

psychological language for it to be current. At the same time, as Foucault (1988) wrote about the “experience of oneself” being intensified by the writing of *hypomnēmata*, it would be odd to suggest that those writers who developed new literary practices did not at the same time experience new subjectivities. The simplest conclusion is that the psychological ‘interior’ in psychological language does not depend on a corresponding subjective experience in a given author. Rather, the ‘interior’ dimension in reflexive discourse is heavily influenced by changes in literary practices over time, subjectivity notwithstanding. The subjective experience of the author should be interpreted subsequent to the content of his or her discourse and the form of his or her practices. This is not to deny the significance of subjective experiences, but to limit historical scholarship appropriately.¹⁵

Of course, we have only treated of a handful of authors within a limited time period. It would certainly be interesting to continue the analysis of the relationship between literary practices and wider psychological language prior to the period examined, with Cicero, Philo, and Plato, for example.

But above all, it remains to be seen how much the ‘interior’ of modern psychological discourse owes to that inaugurated by Augustine, and how the literary practices and issues shown to be instrumental in that development remain current today. As we saw from the historical examples, variation in literary practices correspond to variation in the character of “interior.” And although the persistence of the silent reading might explain its endurance in the modern context, to examine it as a dimension in the Psychological language of today would require a much more extensive treatment, not to mention the rest of the factors that I have used in this paper. Several more factors might be required, not least among which—given the rise and fall of various world views—would be the ability of an expert class, be they clergymen or psychologists, in prescribing the subjective experience of the population at large.

As such, the ‘interior’ dimension of psychological language and reflexive discourse, and its associated literary practices and issues—not to mention its personal and subjective importance—represent a rich, if complex, topic of investigation for historians in this field. The future, be it podcasted, live-blogged, or open-sourced, will be significant.

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15. This I say in the light of the tumult arising out of the likes of Jaynes's (1976) proposal, which the current one is likely to be compared to. It is possible that such theses could be credibly supported if revised with regard to the literary practices of the authors involved.

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